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Abstract
 According to David Garland (1990) punishment today is ‘a deeply problematic 
aspect of social life’ resulting in a ‘crisis in penological modernism’. This study explores 
Garland’s claim through an examination of Canadian parole policy and practice. Utilizing 
a governmentality analytic this study determines what rationales are assembled to 
support Canadian parole. This is achieved through a discourse analysis of the missions, 
mandates and objectives of Canadian parole policy and semi-structured interviews with 
Canadian parole agents working in the field. Understanding the field of Canadian parole 
as a ‘field of struggle’ illuminates implications in regards to the partnerships in parole, 
the agency of parole agents and the assemblage of parole governance in Canada. It is 
argued that Garland’s claim in regards to a ‘crisis’ is unfounded in Canadian parole as 
there is a pervasive institutional identity evidenced by the discourses in Canadian parole 
policy and the practices of parole agents. 
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The relationship between crime and punishment has been criticized for being 
determined by crime which is over simplified. It is no longer sufficient to explain 
punishment as a moral problem and/or a state endorsed crime prevention or control 
mechanism. While penal systems do address the problem of crime, practices of 
punishment are heavily influenced by “cultural conventions, economic resources, 
institutional dynamics, and political arguments” (Garland:1991:120). More importantly, 
the practices and processes of punishment are exercised by a diverse group of actors 
who are situated in the realm of the social and are impacted (to varying degrees) by the 
social institution of punishment and their social positioning. As a consequence, 
punishment today cannot be characterized as a homogenous set of ideals and 
practices. Rather, as Pat OʼMalley (1999:175) explains, “contemporary penal policy and 
practice is characterized by an unusual degree of incoherence and volatility.” 
# Many scholars [see Feeley and Simon: 1992, Garland: 2001, Hannah-Moffat:
2004, and 2005, Lynch:1998, OʼMalley:1999, and Rose:1996] have attempted to explain 
the ʻvolatileʼ nature of contemporary penology. In his work on Punishment and Modern 
Society David Garland (1990:3) explains, “punishment today is a deeply problematic 
and barely understood aspect of social life, the rationale for which is by no means 
clear.” Garland (1990:7) calls this lack of an ideological framework or rationale the ʻcrisis 
in penological modernismʼ where what is placed in doubt is not just the effectiveness of 
particular policies but the very capacity of the state to simultaneously address the 
problem of crime and promote welfare. According to Garland (1990:4), “for nearly two 
decades now those working in prisons, probation, and penal administration have been 
engaged in an unsuccessful search to find a ʻnew philosophyʼ or ʻnew rationaleʼ for 
punishment.” Further, agents in the penal sphere have been forced to rethink what it is 
they do, and to re-address foundational questions about the justification and purposes 
of penal sanctions, without thus far having found a suitable set of terms to rebuild an 
institutional identity (Garland:1990:6).
The following study set out to explore Garlandʼs claims regarding the ʻcrisis in 
penological modernismʼ through an examination of contemporary Canadian parole 
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policies and practices. Utilizing a governmentality analytic, in which history appears as 
socially constructed rather than determined by theory or logic, this analysis will 
determine what rationales are assembled to support contemporary Canadian parole 
(Foucault:1997, Hunt and Wickham:1994:75-78, OʼMalley:2008:454-457, Rose et al:
2006:97-101). This is achieved through a multi-method analysis: The first part being a 
discourse analysis of the mission statements, mandates, and objectives of Canadian 
parole policy with the intent to reveal what is said in parole discourse. The second part 
being semi-structured interviews conducted with Canadian parole agents working in the 
field of parole with the intent to reveal what is seen in Canadian parole practice and 
procedure. Information collected in the discourse analysis, representing management 
discourse, is then compared and contrasted with the interview data, representing parole 
agent discourse. When taken together these two methods illuminate important 
similarities and disjunctures between managers (responsible for the creation of parole 
policy and management of parole operations in Canada) and field agents (responsible 
for the implementation of parole policy and practice in Canada). Also evident, are 
similarities and disjunctures between the agencies responsible for carrying out parole 
governance in Canada (primarily the National Parole Board and the Correctional 
Service of Canada)1. 
Perhaps most intriguing, is that this study demonstrates that in Canada Garlandʼs 
(1990) claim of a ʻcrisis in penological modernismʼ is unfounded. There is in fact a real 
and pervasive institutional identity evident in Canadian parole which is exercised, to 
varying degrees, through a chain of command by agents in the field. As such, the 
following study will draw on Bigoʼs (2005) notion of the ʻfield of struggleʼ and Larnerʼs 
and Butlerʼs (2004) work on local collaborative partnerships to explain the institutional 
identity found in Canadian parole policy and practice. This study will also address the 
ways in which Canadian parole policies and practices are implemented by Canadian 
parole agencies and exercised by agents working in the field of Canadian parole. 
Rather than viewing changes in parole governance as a ʻcrisisʼ it will be argued that 
parole is a contested ʻfield of struggleʼ. This approach will simultaneously acknowledge 
the agency of parole agents as well as explain the volatile and contradictory rationale 
informing Canadian parole policy and practice.
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II. Theoretical Overview
# The following analysis specifically examines Canadian parole governance; as 
such, this analysis problematizes how parole is governed and the conditions under 
which parole operates and is transformed (Dean:2010:33). While lecturing on Security, 
Territory, and Population, Foucault (1978:67) initially coined the term governmentality to 
refer to the formal apparatusʼ of the state, the processes, practices, and relations of 
government. Foucault (1978) would later refer to this as the ʻconduct of conductʼ, where 
conduct meant to lead or direct oneʼs behaviour and/or actions requiring a level of 
deliberation in regards to how this leading or directing should be done.2 Government 
then, in governmentality studies is 
# any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
# authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of 
# knowledge that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desire, 
# aspirations, interests, and beliefs of various actors for definite but shifting ends 
# and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and 
# outcomes (Dean:2010:18).
# This study will use Canadian parole as a case in which to analyze the authority 
granted to governing agencies within Canadian parole which includes the National 
Parole Board, Correctional Service of Canada, and community residential facilities.  
According to Dean (2010:18) “an analysis of government is concerned with the means 
of calculation both quantitative and qualitative, type of governing authority or agency, 
and the forms of knowledge, techniques, or other means employed, the entity to be 
governed and how it is conceived, the ends sought and the outcomes and 
consequences.” However, it is equally important to emphasize that governance is never 
a finished process and so analyses of governance must avoid totalizing explanations 
and/or grandiose theoretical claims. According to Foucault (1978:67), by 
governmentality he meant “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses, 
reflections, calculations and tactics that allows for the exercise of this very complex 
power.” This study understands parole policy to be governed by an assemblage which 
includes the “ensemble” mentioned by Foucault (1978) as well as objectives, texts, and 
discourses all of which coalesce in regards to the rationale of the assemblage. In the 
introduction to their work A Thousand Plateaus Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
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(1987:4) use the metaphor of a ʻbody without organsʼ to describe the assemblage. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987:22-23) explain that an assemblage establishes connections 
between multiplicities and acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows 
simultaneously.
# An assemblage is a capricious thing as its fluid and multiple nature makes it 
difficult to pin down a common element in the assemblage. According to OʼConnor and 
Ilcan (2005:2-3), “the consistency of an assemblage lies in the regularity of its effects, 
and in the work of thought that aims to hold the disparate elements together by 
providing a coherent rationale for its functioning.” Accordingly, this study aims to 
examine the coherent rationale that holds the various elements of the assemblage 
governing Canadian parole together. Still, elements of the assemblage of parole 
governance should be understood as having diverse historical trajectories, as being 
polymorphous in their internal and external relations, and as bearing upon a multiple 
and wide range of problems and issues (Dean:2010:40). In times of change, as evident 
in Canadian parole today, the parole assemblage is being disassembled and re-
assembled as new problems arise and new solutions to these problems are formulated.
3 In the field of Canadian parole, the various assemblages associated with parole 
governance are being re-purposed borrowing from existing techniques, procedures, 
discourses, texts, and so on to constitute a re-assemblage. It is this re-assemblage that 
has become pervasive in Canadian parole refuting Garlandʼs (1990) claim of a ʻcrisis in 
penological modernismʼ. 
In examining the policies of the various agencies charged with overseeing 
Canadian parole as well as engaging in discussions with field agents working within 
these various agencies, and charged with implementing the policies associated with 
parole, I was able to determine how Canadian parole governance is re-assembled. This 
new parole assemblage or re-assemblage embraces a variety of past governing 
rationales which were once seen as dichotomous; however, in Canadian parole today 
these rationales have coalesced into an over-arching rationale which encompasses a 
multitude of volatile and contradictory techniques, procedures, objectives, tactics, and 
so on. Thus, this over-arching rationale or assemblage of parole governance holds the 
elements together forming their consistency. 
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Assembling Parole Governance (Past to Present)
# Historically, three assemblages are said to have informed and constrained 
practices of parole governance. From the mid 19th century to the mid 20th century, 
industrialization made the discipline of the labour market the most compelling anchor for 
parole (Simon:1993:9). The primary function of disciplinary techniques is to train the 
offender in order to correct their criminal behaviour following the structure of factory life.  
Evidence of disciplinary techniques are present in contemporary Canadian parole policy  
and practice in regimented community management strategies and plans of care. 
During the 1950ʼs and 1960ʼs parole moved towards a clinical model drawn from 
medicine and social work (Simon:1993:9). This model of parole, associated with a 
welfare assemblage emphasizes the treatment and integration of offenders into the law-
abiding community. Both treatment and reintegration remain (to varying degrees) an 
aspect of contemporary Canadian parole. Since the 1970ʼs, a collapsing economy and 
increased legal and political demands for accountability have driven parole towards a 
managerial model associated with neo-liberalism (Simon:1993:9). Parole in Canada is 
abundant with instances of bureaucracy for example; parole agents are responsible for 
the collection of masses of paperwork such as static and dynamic risk assessments and 
community contact assessments among many others all of which form an offenderʼs 
case.#
Contemporarily, it is argued (see: Feeley and Simon:1992, Garland:1990, 
Hannah-Moffat:2005, Lynch:1998, Rose:1996, Simon:1993, and Dean:2010) that the 
two assemblages most commonly understood as governing parole are the welfare and 
neo-liberal assemblages.4 According to the welfare assemblage, the subject of 
punishment is the ʻdelinquentʼ and the purpose of punishment is the transformation of 
the subjectʼs soul, in order to address the needs of offenders (such as education, work, 
refamilialization, mental illness, addiction, and so on) through various treatment 
programs. Following the welfare assemblage, the parole agent assumes a counselor 
role in which they are required to have an ever-increasing knowledge of the offender in 
order to accurately assess and address offender needs best achieved through 
meaningful and regular interactions. 
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# The welfare assemblage of parole governance suggests that the field of parole is 
governed in the interests of social protection, social justice, and social solidarity. 
However, this conception of the social is said to be undergoing a change from ʻsocial 
welfareʼ to ʻcommunity riskʼ. Under the auspices of neo-liberalism governing the field of 
parole requires one to investigate, map, classify, document, interpret and demarcate a 
sector or community (Rose:1996:332). Feeley and Simon (1992) refer to this shift in 
penal governance generally as the ʻnew penologyʼ.5 This new penology is less 
concerned with social responsibility, moral fault, or the resultant treatment of offenders. 
Instead new penology is concerned with techniques of identification, classification, and 
management sorting aggregates of offenders according to dangerousness. Following 
the neo-liberal assemblage encompassing new penology the parole officer assumes the 
role of surveillance officer emphasizing risk management and strict control. 
# The neo-liberal assemblage of parole governance is intimately connected to the 
idea of risk. According to Francois Ewald (1993: 227) in the 20th century, at the dawn of 
neo-liberalism, the way was opened for the universalization of the notion of risk in which 
risk acquired an ontological status. Presently, it is still understood that risk never 
completely evaporates; while it can be minimized and localized it cannot totally dissipate 
(Dean:2010:195). Ewaldʼs conception of risk as a form of rationality, a way of thinking 
about and representing events, is important in this exploration of Canadian parole 
governance as assemblages of parole governance use the notion of risk as a lens 
through which to view, interpret and represent parole. This interpretation of risk creates 
a division between active citizens capable of managing their own risk and ʻhighʼ risk, 
disadvantaged groups who require intervention in the management of their risk such as 
parolees (Dean:2010:195).Those deemed ʻat riskʼ of being a danger to the community 
are subject to a range of practices with the intent to either eliminate them completely 
from communal spaces or to lower the dangers posed by their risk. 
While there is an enduring argument in penology that a new penological 
assemblage has replaced the welfare assemblage of penal governance some scholars 
(see Hannah-Moffat: 2004 and 2005, Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat 2006:439, Lynch: 
1998, Dean:2010, among others) warn that risk is too often juxtaposed with need and 
the so-called erosion of welfare practices are overestimated. New penal technologies 
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combine, merge, and continually reassemble risk with other logics in response to 
various institutional agendas. Accordingly, risk rationalities and practices should be 
understood as multiple and heterogeneous where the government of risk is assembled 
from diverse elements and put together in numerous ways (Dean:2010:211). Kelley 
Hannah-Moffat (2005) describes this process of merging in her conceptualization of the 
hybridization of risk and need. According to Hannah-Moffat (2005:30), “risk-based 
actuarial models have not simply replaced welfare strategies...[instead] risk is melded 
with other policy orientations such as rehabilitation and restorative justice.” Further, 
although the notion of need can be considered distinct from that of risk, such 
distinctions are difficult to ascertain in part because needs are presented in correctional 
policy as dynamic risk factors under the umbrella of criminogenic factors (Hannah-
Moffat:2005:373). The parole officer in this conceptualization must be flexible, enforcing 
strict controls in some cases and acting as a counselor in others depending on the 
needs of the offender (Information Guide to Assist Victims:2008:20). 
# Two studies were instrumental in the design and implementation of the following 
analysis. In her study, Mona Lynch (1998) conducted ethnographic field research, 
specifically participant observation and formal and informal interviews, in a parole office 
in central California.6 According to Lynch (1998:844) front-line parole agents emphasize 
the role demands they feel are worthwhile within a set of broad organizational 
constraints, and will subvert or downplay tasks and duties deemed unimportant or 
problematic. What Lynch (1998) discovered was that, although agents often referenced 
a neo-liberal and welfare assemblage of parole governance, parole agents embraced a 
traditional law-enforcement role and took an individualistic approach to the management 
of cases rather than following preventative models of parole associated with risk 
management. In a study conducted by Bayens et al. (1998) on “The Impact of the ʻNew 
Penologyʼ on ISP” (Intensive Supervision Probation), ISP workloads and the attitudes of 
criminal justice workgroups in the midwestern county of the United States were studied 
through a discourse analysis of various documents and case loads associated with 
parole work in the midwest.7 Bayens et al. (1998:59) found that the new managerial 
objective of providing custody without walls and allocating increased face-to-face 
contact with high risk offenders in the community on ISP promised by the new penology 
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is not being achieved. As such, Bayens et al. (1998) conclude that the new penology is 
more rhetoric than reality. Both of these studies demonstrate that parole can be useful 
to explain the upper management of parole as evident in parole policy; however, field 
level operations involve a more complex narrative about the ways parole is being (re) 
defined by parole agents (Lynch:1998:866). It is this contested dimension of parole that 
I utilize as the point of departure for the critical discourse analysis and interviews which 
comprise the current study. Canadian parole agents working in a variety of parole 
agencies (including the National Parole Board, Correctional Service of Canada, and 
non-governmental parole agencies) were interviewed over a twenty week period of time. 
Interviewees occupied a variety of positions within Canadian parole such as parole 
officers or agents, executive directors of agencies, directors of policy operations, and 
managers of training and recruitment.8
Parole in Canada
! According to the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), parole is a community 
sanction whereby offenders serve part of their sentence in the community where, in 
some cases they adhere to certain conditions and are supervised by staff known as 
parole officers (or agents). Full parole is a form of conditional release that allows an 
offender to serve part of their sentence in the community (CSC:2007:1). Offenders (with 
the exception of those serving life sentences for murder) are eligible to apply for full 
parole after serving either one third or seven years of their sentence (CSC:2007:1). 
Offenders serving life sentences for first degree murder are eligible to apply for parole 
after serving 25 years in prison and offenders serving life sentences for second-degree 
murder are eligible to apply for full parole between 10 and 25 years of their sentence 
and the court sets these dates at the time of sentencing (CSC:2007:1).
# While on day parole the offender resides at a correctional institution or 
community residential facility but is given the opportunity to participate in community-
based activities (CSC:2007:1). Offenders serving sentences of two to three years are 
eligible for day parole after serving six months of their sentence and offenders serving 
three years or more are eligible for day parole six months prior to full parole eligibility
(CSC:2007:1). Further, offenders serving life sentences are eligible for day parole three 
years before their full parole eligibility date. Offenders (except those serving life 
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sentences or indeterminate sentences) are also granted day parole to prepare for 
statutory release. According to statutory release, by law offenders are automatically 
released after serving two thirds of their sentence (National Parole Board:2009:1). In 
March 1994, bill C-254 facilitated the denial of statutory release to offenders convicted 
of: A sexual offence against a child; possession of child pornography; causing bodily 
harm with the intent to torture and lure a child by way of the internet; causing death or 
serious injury; high treason; or sexual exploitation of a person with a disability 
(Department of Justice:2010:1). Bill C-254 granted CSC the authority to review all 
statutory release cases to determine whether they should refer the case to the National 
Parole Board (NPB) where the NPB is granted the authority to order the offender 
detained until sentence expiry or order special residency requirements be upheld during 
the offenders period of release (Department of Justice:2010:1). As such, it appears that 
statutory release has become a “gating” mechanism whereby neo-liberal legislation has 
withstood charter challenges overriding welfare policies of the past. The authority to 
grant parole is found in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) and the 
respective provincial legislation under the auspices of the Commissioners Directives. 
According to the CCRA, the NPB has exclusive jurisdiction and absolute discretion to 
grant, deny, terminate or revoke parole for offenders in federal, territorial, and many 
provincial institutions (with the exception of Ontario and Quebec where there are 
provincial parole boards) (CSC: 2009). 
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III. Analysis/ Findings
Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA)
# The CCRA, approved in 1992, is an extensive body of legislation detailing the 
authority of both the CSC and the NPB. According to the CCRA (1992:4), “the purpose 
of the federal correctional system is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful, 
and safe society.” While notions of safety are often coupled with discourses of risk, the 
welfare assemblage is a big supporter of maintaining a peaceful society and justice is 
an ideal of both the welfare and neo-liberal assemblages; however, differently 
conceived. So, in outlining the purpose of corrections in Canada the CCRA points to 
three elements of a good or well-ordered society (justice, peace, and safety) the 
implementation of which can be interpreted in a variety of ways according to a number 
of rationales. The CCRA continues to outline the powers and authority of both the CSC 
and the NPB. The NPB has the authority to grant parole or statutory release to an 
offender if it finds that the offender will not present an undue risk to society and will 
contribute to the protection of society through successful reintegration. Whereas, the 
CSC is responsible for programs that rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders into the 
community that have been granted parole or statutory release (CCRA:1992:5-6 and 
47-48). Important to note here is that the duty to protect society is bestowed upon both 
the CSC and NPB which will be re-visited in a closer examination of their respective 
policies and practices. The CCRA outlines the responsibilities of both the CSC and 
NPB, and in so doing, engages discourses of public safety, risk-management, and 
rehabilitation and reintegration as well as offender need identification through treatment 
and programs. The CCRA promotes a strong commitment to the protection of society in 
such a way that does not overtly support one model of parole governance over another. 
# In my discussions with field agents I was reminded on several occasions that 
agents working within either the CSC or NPB and the agencies themselves are bound 
by legislation. An interviewee, responsible for the oversight of policy, explained that one 
of their major responsibilities was to ensure that the policies of the organization reflects 
the legislation and supports the legislation because failure to do so could mean 
insufficient program funding (Interview: Dec 1st 2010). Another interviewee explained 
how both parole managers and agents are governed by legislative documents: The 
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“CCRA is number one” in regards to the basic laws and regulations around conditional 
release and the CCRA “creates a sort of paddock for board members where so long as 
they stay within the law (such as the CCRA) they are okay” (Interview: Dec 2nd 2010). 
# These interviewees made it clear that parole agents are bound by law and 
legislation and should a parole agent choose to work outside the law or legislation 
repercussions would follow. However, this was not the case for all levels of Canadian 
parole. In a discussion with a director of a community residential facility it was explained 
that community residential facilities (CRF) are contracted agencies so, while certain 
benchmarks and expectations are established, these agencies are not held to such 
stringent legislative demands (Interview: Jan 5th 2011).9  More concerning to the CRF 
was the possibility of an audit (every three years) where standards such as first aid and 
CPR must be maintained by all employees (Interview: Jan 5th 2011). Nevertheless, 
legislation sets the tone for parole policy and with a strong commitment to protecting the 
public resonating in the CCRA it seems likely that this discourse of public protection will 
be reflected in the policies of the NPB and CSC.
National Parole Board (NPB)
! The mission statement of the NPB as outlined in their policy manual states: “The 
NPB, as part of the Criminal Justice System, makes independent quality conditional 
release and pardon decisions and clemency recommendations and the board 
contributes to the protection of society by facilitating as appropriate, the timely 
integration of offenders as law-abiding citizens” (NPB:2010:1.1) The NPB is granted a 
large amount of responsibility and authority in their ability to determine who is eligible for 
parole, conditional release, or a criminal pardon and clemency recommendation. I was 
reminded on several occasions by agents working within the NPB that the Board is an 
independent organization whose decision-making authority is unique when it comes to 
parole decisions in Canada. As such, the NPB policy manual is a very important 
document as it (along with the legislation) provides the boundaries within which parole 
decisions are to be made and Board members and staff are to be held accountable. The 
NPB policy manual outlines four core values, the first of which is to contribute to “the 
attainment of a just, peaceful, and safe society” therefore reflecting the paramount 
concern of the CCRA (NPB:2010:1.1). Core values two and three explain that the NPB 
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respects the dignity and equal rights of all members of society and welcomes the 
contribution of qualified individuals to promote the Boardʼs mission (NPB:2010:1.1). 
Core value four is unique in that it states the Board is “committed to openness, integrity, 
and accountability in the execution of its mandate” (NPB:2010: 1.1). It is not typical for 
governing agencies, particularly those in such a close relationship with the state, such 
as the NPB, to operate at a transparent level; rather in the case of many governing 
agencies (as will be clear in the case of the CSC) gaining access to and understanding 
their policies and practices requires a substantial amount of effort and perseverance. 
# Agents within the NPB also spoke of the open and transparent nature of the 
organization noting public hearings, public access to decision registries, media 
presence during some trials, and regular information published for public viewing. 
However, when questioned about the role of public opinion in regards to parole and 
conditional release decisions it was made clear that the NPB is an independent 
organization and that Board members are “expected to provide independent decisions 
and are not influenced by government, politicians, or media” (Interview: Dec 1st 2010). 
However, one respondent had a more complex response: “The real answer, the truth is 
that [public/media attention] does have an effect on the board member 
experience” (Interview: Dec 2nd 2010). It was then explained that in a situation of 
intense public scrutiny where a case could go either way the Board is more likely to vote 
“No” in regards to a parole or conditional release decision (Interview: Dec 2nd 2010). 
Therefore, while the NPB prides itself on being open and transparent this transparency 
is a controlled transparency in which the Board determines who has access to 
information and what information is available to the public. 
# The policy manual of the NPB explains that the Boardʼs decision-making policies 
are based on the following principles: (1) “The protection of society is the paramount 
consideration in any conditional release decision” which is consistent with the CCRA 
(NPB:2010:1.2). This discourse of protection is consistent with both risk-management 
strategies and needs identification techniques. Principle (2) states: “Supervised release 
increases the offenderʼs potential for successful reintegration and thereby contributes to 
the long term protection of society” (NPB:2010:1.2). This principle, while emphasizing 
the importance of supervised release, refrains from using language characteristic of 
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new penology such as monitored release and couples this idea of supervision with 
successful reintegration characteristic of the welfare model of parole governance. 
Principle (3) states: “Restrictions on the freedom of the offender in the community must 
be limited to those necessary and reasonable to protect society and to facilitate 
reintegration” (NPB:2010:1.2). Agents of the NPB confirmed these three principles of 
conduct with the exception of future changes to principle three. It was explained that 
currently the law requires that the Board seek the least restrictive option for the offender 
consistent with public safety; however, this phrase is going to be altered so that the 
board focuses specifically on public safety with no mention of “least restriction to the 
offender” (Interview: Dec 2nd 2010). In the words of one respondent, “itʼs a subtle 
change but it is also a very significant and profound difference” (Interview: Dec 2nd 
2010). This is significant because the Board, following the rationale of public safety, will 
be free to interpret the best means to achieve this goal with very few restrictions and will 
not have to consider the impact on the offender as entailed in current legislation. 
# Mechanisms and means of assessment are crucial in an examination of 
governance and the policy manual for the NPB outlines the “criteria for assessing if the 
offender presents an undue risk to society and the processes of pre-release 
decisions” (NPB:2010:2.1). According to the NPBʼs policy manual (2010:2.1) “the 
determination of undue risk is based on an assessment of the offenderʼs likelihood of re-
offending taking into account the nature and severity of the offence that could be 
anticipated should the offender re-offend.” However, Board members, in reviewing an 
offenderʼs case, will also analyze the offenderʼs criminal and social history including an 
assessment of the offenderʼs identified needs, issues surrounding employment, the 
nature of the current offence, previous breaches of supervision conditions, inventory of 
violent behaviour, family violence, mental health status, recommendation of the 
sentence judge, victim information, information from provincial authorities and 
information from community contacts (teachers, family, employers, friends, and so on) 
(NPB: 2010: 2.1). Determining the risk of the offender requires an analysis of multiple 
criminogenic factors from education and family to violence and criminal history. It seems 
that risk here encompasses a wide breadth of elements including those typically 
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associated with a neo-liberal conception of risk but also those elements more closely 
associated with discourses of need. 
# The NPB (2010:2.2) also outlines, “hallmarks of quality decision making” to assist 
board members in assessing whether or not an offender presents an undue risk to 
society and to ensure quality decisions are being made. According to the NPB 
(2010:2.2) the hallmarks of a quality decision include a decision that; reflects the 
Boardʼs commitment to the protection of the public while maintaining the principle of 
least restrictive determination; reflects that an impartial consideration of a case was 
undertaken; reflects all relevant aspects of the case, including the offenderʼs patterns of 
behaviour; reflects an assessment and analysis of risk factors and needs areas; and 
reflects an assessment of the community management strategies to be employed 
during the period of supervision in order to address offender needs and mange risk. 
Rather than privileging one strategy over another these hallmarks demonstrate that 
penal policy is not necessarily a consistent whole. Once again a rationale of public 
safety is being utilized in order to destabilize a risk/need dichotomy. As OʼMalley (1999) 
observes, we are witnessing ʻmixed models of governanceʼ or a hybrid assemblage of 
parole governance under the rationale of public safety where strategies of risk 
management are melded with other policy orientations such as reintegration and 
rehabilitation. When asked to describe the top job priority of Board members 
respondents all made mention of their responsibility to make ʻquality decisionsʼ. It was 
explained that quality decision making requires Board members to stay true to the 
philosophies of the NPB as outlined in the policy manual and specifically the hallmarks 
in order to ensure the best possible decisions are being made (Interview Dec 1st 2010). 
# The NPB policy manual also outlines the procedures for imposing special 
conditions on an offenderʼs release as well as post release interventions. According to 
the NPB policy manual (2010:7.1) Board members must be satisfied that without the 
assistance and control afforded by compliance with the suggested special condition, the 
offender presents an undue risk to society. A special condition must relate directly to a 
need identified in the decision documentation or behaviour that the Board members 
consider inappropriate or unacceptable (NPB:2010:7.1). The Board will remove or vary 
a condition when the condition or part of the condition is no longer reasonable and 
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necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate the offenderʼs reintegration in 
society. The policy detailing whether or not special conditions are necessary for an 
offenderʼs release or when to remove these conditions is predicated on an idea of 
balance: Balancing the safety of the community by mitigating undue risk and balancing 
the need for a smooth transition into the community. Once again need and risk are 
presented as being reciprocally related, and in the case of special conditions, risk and 
need are fluid terms shifting and merging the rationales of traditional assemblages of 
parole governance under the rationale of public safety. Similar to special conditions, the 
NPB will intervene in an offenderʼs release when either behaviour or circumstance 
suggests an increase in the level of risk. When assessing whether or not risk has 
changed the Board will review and analyze the offenderʼs many factors including 
progress in addressing the community correctional plan, the parole officerʼs risk 
assessment, any circumstances surrounding a breach of special conditions, and a 
comparison of the offenderʼs behaviour with previous patterns of criminal behaviour 
(NPB:2010:8.1). Important to note here is that in evaluating changes in offender risk the 
NPB does not rely solely on a static conception of risk in which offenders are sorted into 
dangerous aggregates for the purpose of long-term management. In the case that the 
NPB has to intervene in an offenderʼs release, returning the offender to an institution is 
not an ideal response, as this would counter the principle of successful reintegration 
unless of course the offender was found guilty of committing another offence for which 
they are required to serve another sentence in an institution. Nevertheless, the NPB 
must walk a fine line when imposing special conditions or intervening in an offenderʼs 
release: Managing undue risk to society while addressing offenderʼs needs is no easy 
task particularly when conceptions of what constitutes undue risk and offender need are 
fluid embracing the logic of a hybrid assemblage of parole governance under the 
rationale of public safety.
# The NPB is a unique organization in that it has absolute authority or independent 
administrative tribunal to grant, deny, cancel, terminate, or revoke any form of parole. 
The CCRA and the NPB policy manual attribute a great amount of autonomy to Board 
members when it comes to making important and arduous parole decisions. As my 
examination of the policy manual demonstrates while there are guidelines or hallmarks 
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in place to ensure quality decisions are being made Board members are still granted a 
vast amount of discretion in their decision-making. It will soon become clear that this is 
in profound contradiction to the decision-making capabilities of agents working in the 
CSC. In fact, the NPB policy manual (NPB:2010:8.1) makes a point in explaining that 
“neither release decisions nor decisions in regards to special conditions will be left to 
the discretion of the parole supervisor” as this would “inappropriately delegate authority 
to the parole supervisor.” Board members analyze and assess all information collected 
by parole officers working within CSC which is important because the means by which 
this information is collected and the assemblage of parole governance this information 
favours may impact the decision-making of Board members. While an analysis of the 
NPBʼs policy manual indicates that Board members and staff embrace a hybrid public 
safety assemblage of parole governance, I now turn to an analysis of the policies 
guiding the CSC in order to determine whether or not this agency is providing the NPB 
with information saturated in a similar discourse.
Correctional Service of Canada (CSC)
! Similar to the NPBʼs policy manual the CSCʼs Commissionerʼs Directives outline 
the principles and core values which reflect the CCRA and provide parole agents with 
the framework upon which all of their responsibilities and tasks are based. The mission 
of the CSC is to provide “clear direction to all staff of the service in the exercise of their 
responsibilities and a basis upon which the service will be held accountable” (CSC: 
2003:2 ). According to the Commissionerʼs Directives (CSC:2003:2) all internal 
regulatory documents must conform to the mission document, and promote the 
achievement of the mission. Where the NPB upheld the importance of decision-making 
the CSC is concerned with accountability, internal regulation, and the dissemination of 
rules and standards of operations by upper management through a chain of command. 
According to the Commissionerʼs Directives (CSC:2003:2) the core values of the CSC 
are as follows: (1) Respect the dignity of individuals, the rights of all members of society, 
and the potential for human growth and development; (2) recognize that the offender 
has the potential to live as a law-abiding citizen; (3) the strength and major resource in 
achieving their objectives is that staff and human relationships are the cornerstone of 
this endeavour; (4) the sharing of ideas, knowledge, and values is essential to the 
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achievement of their mission; (5) managing the service with openness and integrity. 
These values shed light on the structure and techniques used to govern parole agents 
behaviour or what the ʻconduct of conductʼ is for a parole agent working in the CSC. 
According to the mission of the CSC (2003:3), “[parole officers] must be as loyal in their 
implementation as they are fearless in their advice...they must have an unshakable 
conviction about the importance and primacy of the law and constitution.” While CSC 
recognizes the importance of its staff in carrying out the policy objectives of the 
Commissionerʼs Directives there is a clear effort on the part of the CSC to govern the 
decision-making and behaviour of those working within the organization according to 
the mandates of the Commissionerʼs Directives as well as the Canadian law and 
constitution.
# The Correctional Service of Canada has strict rules which forbid parole officers 
and staff from providing opinions on policy to members of the public. In one particular 
correspondence I was informed that employees are bound by the standards of conduct 
and in whatever they do at work, they are expected to follow policy, regardless of 
whether they agree with it or not. Failure to do so could “jeopardize public safety and 
depending on the severity result in strict disciplinary action”. Further, I was told the 
standards of conduct for employees states that, “disagreement with a policy does not 
mean that staff members can neglect their duties.” Employees are free to question 
policy, procedure, or instructions but are expected to do so within appropriate channels. 
In particular, “employees must not be critical of policy or operations in front of offenders 
or the public; to do so is to encourage a lack of respect for the correctional service of 
Canada and its staff.” In all of my correspondence with the CSC I was told that any 
questions I may have in regards to the work of parole officers I could find by reading the 
Commissionerʼs Directives. Further, the Commissionerʼs Directives were explained to 
be an exact replication of the daily tasks of parole officers.
# In one particular discussion with a parole agent I was informed, “parole officers 
are bound by the Commissionerʼs Directives which cover everything...the 
Commissionerʼs Directives are our bible and can determine whether a case is followed 
properly so they are extremely important documents” (Interview: Oct 13th 2010). This 
particular interviewee with their reference to the ʻbiblicalʼ importance of the 
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Commissionerʼs Directives illustrates that employees maintain a certain reverence and 
respect for these policy documents. Further, the CSC as an organization maintains strict 
control over the decision making capacity of parole officers and staff in mandating that 
they adhere to CSC policy exclusively in their daily operations in order to maintain 
public safety. This is in contrast to members of the NPB who analyze and review cases 
in order to maintain public safety with a large amount of discretion in their decision 
making. Still, parole officers working in the CSC are bound by the Commissionerʼs 
Directives to follow the techniques, assessment models, decision making strategies, 
and practices laid out in the policy documents of the CSC.
# The community supervision framework of the Commissionerʼs Directives (CSC: 
2008:1) provides direction for a parole officer on the progress required to monitor and 
document an offenderʼs progress throughout his or her period of community supervision 
in the interest of safe reintegration and public safety. According to the principles of the 
community supervision framework (CSC:2008:3) “public safety is the paramount 
consideration in all post-release interventions, recommendations, and decision-making 
both in the short and long term.” Similar to the policy manual of the NPB, the community 
supervision framework holds public safety above all else merging both the traditional 
clinical or welfare model of parole governance and the neo-liberal risk-management 
model of parole governance. The community supervision framework (CSC:2008:9) 
further explains, “the parole officer will intervene to address the offenderʼs needs and 
manage risk and any offender safety concerns by making effective use of community 
resources and collateral contacts [family members, friends, co-workers, teachers, and 
so on].” Here we see that both addressing offender needs and managing offender risk 
are an important responsibility of the parole officer. According to the community 
supervision framework (CSC:2008:3) ratings of risk refer to static factors, dynamic 
factors, level of motivation or reintegration potential. It is the combination of static risk 
with dynamic need that allows for a fluid and malleable conception of risk associated 
with a hybrid assemblage of parole governance (Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat:
2006:443). Agents working in the field corroborated that the implementation of the 
Commissionerʼs Directives involved a collaborative approach involving various 
members of both the public and private sectors in order to ensure a smooth transition 
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for an offender and to ensure public safety via risk assessment (Interview: Oct 13th 
2010). A closer examination of the tools and resources utilized by parole officers to 
determine offender risk and need will further illustrate the duality of risks and needs in 
CSC policy and practice.
# The community transition and post-release assessment (CSC:2008:1) provides 
parole officerʼs direction on assessing and managing an offenderʼs transition into the 
community following release from an institution. According to this document, level of 
intervention refers to the minimum frequency of face-to-face contacts per month that the 
parole officer is required to have with his/her assigned offender (CSC:2008:1). The 
highest level of intervention is called intensive supervision practice (ISP) and includes 
an increased level of face-to-face interviews, collateral contacts, case conferences, and 
appropriate treatment intervention (CSC:2008:3). Offenders designated as in need of 
intensive supervision are rated as having ʻlowʼ re-integration potential and ʻhighʼ static 
and dynamic risk factors. While this rating reflects a neo-liberal strategy of managing 
risk the means of intervention (increased contact with parole officers and community 
partners) reflects a traditional welfare response. Aside from ISP, intervention is ranked 
according to levels: A, B, C, D, and E.10  The number of contacts with parole officers 
varies per level from a minimum of four face-to-face contacts per month to a minimum 
of one face-to-face contact every three months (CSC:2008:5). The number of face-to-
face contacts is determined by a ranking system which gives primacy to the efficient 
control of internal system processes sorting offenders into aggregates: level A (ʻhighʼ 
risk) and so on (Feeley and Simon:1992:450). According to the post-release 
assessment (CSC:2008:7) the parole officer will assign a level of intervention that is 
proportionate to the risk posed by the offender and the need for support in his or her 
safe reintegration. All assessments throughout an offenderʼs period of community 
supervision will focus on offender risk, need and reintegration potential using a variety 
of assessment techniques (as per the Commissionerʼs Directives) in an integrated 
process (CSC:2008:7). It is clear that both offender risk and need are understood as 
important factors in the assessment of an offenderʼs level of intervention and an 
integration process of assessment would suggest that risk and need are reciprocally 
related.  
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# According to the CSC (2008:1) parole officers are to determine levels of 
intervention based on static factors, dynamic factors, levels of motivation, and 
reintegration potential. Static factors are considered unchangeable factors and include 
historical information related to risk available at the time of the offenderʼs admission to 
federal custody, such as a rating on the statistical recidivism scale and a criminal history 
record. Dynamic factors are considered factors which the offender has the power to 
control such as changes in their personal situation, health, and progress related to the 
correctional plan. Motivation includes a feeling of personal responsibility for ones 
problems, willingness to change, level of external support from the community and 
possession of skills and knowledge required to effect change in behaviours. Integration 
potential encompasses all of the above factors; static factors, dynamic factors, 
motivation, and all of the above factors will result in a ranking of ʻlowʼ, ʻmediumʼ, or ʻhigh  ̓
to be determined by the parole officer.  
#  In examining the various assessment mechanisms laid out by the 
Commissionerʼs Directives it is clear that static factors reflect a neo-liberal or new-
penological understanding of risk whereas dynamic factors reflect a need oriented 
discourse associated with a welfare approach to parole governance.11 Similar to the 
NPBʼs policy manual the CSCʼs Commissionerʼs Directives and the various assessment 
mechanisms for determining offender risk also encompass offender need utilizing a fluid 
conception of risk. In a fluid conception of risk, where risk is merged with a needs-based 
welfare logic such as rehabilitation and clinical assessments new forms of risk 
management are produced such as targeted treatment (Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat:
2006:438). As such, rather than being purely neo-liberal based or welfare based, these 
conceptions of risk-management reflect a hybrid assemblage of parole governance 
grounded in a pubic safety rationale. These various assessments, rankings and levels 
of intervention are utilized by parole officers in the creation of a profile and correctional 
plan for each offender in order to ensure public safety by developing a plan that will 
increase the offenderʼs potential for safe reintegration into their communities (CCS: 
2007:1). 
# Despite the highly structured nature of these assessment mechanisms my 
discussions with parole agents demonstrate that the creation of a paroleeʼs profile and 
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correctional plan is more complicated than what is presented in the Commissionerʼs 
Directives. The problems or issues facing each offender are more complex than what 
the categorization techniques (in the Commissionerʼs Directives) capture; hence, it 
becomes the job of the parole officer to couple these assessment mechanisms with 
their notes and detailed case descriptions. When asked to describe the offenders they 
work with one interviewee replied; “challenging...while each offender is unique they can 
be grouped together according to their deficits whether that be mental health issues, 
drug addictions, violence, criminal history and so on”(Interview: Oct 13th 2010). 
However, this interviewee became concerned that they were being too “harsh” in their 
description of offenders and amended their earlier description stating; “primarily 
offenders lack social skills, problem solving skills, and interpersonal skills” (Interview:Oct 
13th 2010). This intervieweeʼs first explanation of the problems or issues facing 
offenders is an endorsement of the assessment mechanisms found in the 
Commissionerʼs Directives. However, after some contemplation the interviewee 
determined these risk-based categorization techniques are too “harsh” suggesting there 
is room for interpretation on the ground by parole agents. While categorizations attempt 
to sort offenders according to dangerousness and risk the parole agentʼs interaction 
with parolees uncovers the different facets of the problems or issues offenders face and 
parole agents must make judgments ʻoff the chartʼ. However, this is juxtaposed by a 
management discourse (evident in policy) which maintains that the Commissionerʼs 
Directives and assessment mechanisms are always upheld in the field. Again, in my 
correspondence with the CSC I was informed that employees are bound by standards 
of conduct and are expected to follow policy. Nevertheless, describing the offenders 
parole agents work with, via case formation, agents utilize both policy documents and 
their own experiences within the field. Where the Commissionerʼs Directives emphasize 
categorization and risk-based aggregates, agents working in the field often append 
more detailed notes providing descriptions of parolees, complicating the standard 
assessment mechanisms. Similarly, both Lynch (1998) and Bayens et al. (1998), in their 
work, demonstrate that field level operations in parole provide more complex narratives 
than upper management evident in parole policy. 
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# Agents working within the CSC highlighted the importance of assessment 
mechanisms in the creation and implementation of correctional plans for offenders. This 
process begins in the institution with the parole officer assessing the offenderʼs progress 
throughout their time in the prison and from this assessment the parole officer will 
recommend any necessary programs and/or restrictions needed upon the offenderʼs 
release (Interview:Oct 13th 2010). The main questions asked here are: “Is the offender 
manageable in the community and can the offenderʼs risk be managed in the 
community?” (Interview:Oct 13th 2010). In order to answer these questions the parole 
officer will interview various community contacts associated with the offender as well as 
determine whether or not the programs the offender needs are available within the 
community. It was emphasized that the parole officer merely recommends special 
factors or conditions for the management of offender risk within the community. These 
recommendations for a community strategy are then sent on to the NPB where the 
strategy will be reviewed and ultimately determined as appropriate or inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, the parole officer is responsible for completing an assessment of offender 
risk utilizing the Commissionerʼs Directives as well as their own experiences in the field 
which encompass a fluid conception of risk and need characteristic of a public safety 
(hybrid) assemblage of parole governance. 
# Similarly, offenders who reside in a community residential facility (primarily for 
long term offenders or ʻlifersʼ) are assigned a ʻplan of careʼ. According to an agent 
working within a Canadian CRF the goal is to create a culture where the offender feels 
safe and that their basic needs are met (Interview: Jan 5th 2011). Further, the ʻplan of 
careʼ outlines the goals the residential facility expects the offender to accomplish while 
under their roof and is reviewed once a month in a staff meeting. Questions asked in 
this case are: “Has he achieved his goals? Does he need new goals? And is this the 
wrong goal?” (Interview: Jan 5th 2011). While the CRF is primarily concerned with 
managing offender risk and maintaining public safety the ʻplan of careʼ is a much more 
dynamic assessment mechanism and involves a substantial amount of reflection and 
flexibility on the part of the CRF. As such, the overall goals and rationale behind this 
assessment mechanism are similar to that of the NPB and CSC; however, the 
implementation reflects a more traditional clinical or social work model of parole 
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governance. Also, important to note here is that offenderʼs residing in a CRF are 
assigned both a ʻplan of careʼ and a community strategy plan some of which will overlap  
but nevertheless these offenders have two assessment mechanisms to fulfill.  The 
Commissionerʼs Directives of the CSC detail the responsibilities and tasks of parole 
officers and provide parole agents with guidelines, tools, and models for assessing 
offender risk. Similar to the policies of the NPB, the CSC utilizes a fluid conception of 
risk resulting in a hybrid public safety assemblage of penal governance.
Changes in Canadian Parole
# In my interviews with Canadian parole agents a central and consistent topic of 
discussion was changes in Canadian parole. I was informed by an agent that Canadian 
parole is currently undergoing “massive changes” as per the ʻTransforming Correctionsʼ 
policy documents recently released (Interview:Oct 13th 2010).12  All of the interviewees 
corroborated that Canadian parole is presently undergoing changes and that big 
changes for Canadian parole are in the making. In 1997, the legislation changed in 
regards to long-term supervision orders (such as parole) so that instead of the final date 
of sentence being the warrant expiry date offenders could be subject to a long-term 
supervision order extending their sentence beyond warrant expiry up to ten years 
(Interview:Dec 1st 2010). More recently, regulations have changed at the NPB where 
parole decisions regarding lifers, and dangerous offenders was once made by a panel 
of three Board members this has been reduced to two Board members (Interviews:Dec 
1st 2010 and Dec 2nd 2010). A key change for community residential facilities occurred 
under the Ontario provincial government led by Mike Harris: “We lost our contract in 
terms of providing beds for provincial parolees because the [Harris government] did 
away with all the support for provincial parole” (Interview: Jan 5th 2011). At all levels of 
Canadian parole I was informed that change is imminent: “We are on the cusp of a 
major shift as legislation passes and then certainly there will be lots of changes in 
philosophy” (Interview: Dec 2nd 2010). One interviewee made mention of the changes I 
have discussed earlier in regards to restrictions for offenders: “Currently the law 
requires that Board members seek out the least restrictive option consistent with public 
safety; however, this phrase is going to be altered so that the focus in specifically on 
public safety removing mention of least restriction to the offender” (Interview:Dec 2nd 
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2010).The current federal conservative governmentʼs ʻget tough on crimeʼ approach was 
credited on several occasions for changes present and future in Canadian parole 
(Interviews:Dec 2nd 2010 and Jan 5th 2011). In utilizing a governmentality approach, 
changes at various times and levels of Canadian parole governance are uncovered; 
however, these changes do not unfold in a linear manner. Instead, Canadian parole has 
undergone and will continue to undergo cycles of assemblage and re-assemblage 
where techniques, objectives, and strategies of parole governance will be created, 
modified, dismissed, and re-surface.
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IV. The Public Safety Assemblage of Canadian Parole Governance
# According to David Garland (1990) there is a ʻcrisis in penological modernismʼ 
and while it is true that agents in the penal sphere (including Canadian parole agents) 
have had to rethink what it is they do and re-address foundational questions about the 
justifications and purposes of penal sanctions Garlandʼs (1990:6) claim is unfounded in 
the case of contemporary Canadian parole. This analysis has demonstrated that 
contemporary Canadian parole policy and practice is governed according to an 
assemblage of public safety. The public safety assemblage is important in that it is a 
hybrid assemblage coupling the traditional welfare model and neo-liberal model of 
parole governance. Public safety acts as the rationale or consistency that aims to hold 
the disparate elements of the assemblage together (OʼConnor and Ilcan:2005:2-3). This 
rationale is both community based and individualized deploying a wide array of 
technologies of parole intervention. Agents working within the field of Canadian parole 
are able to do so with a dual purpose: (1) Managing offender risk and (2) ensuring the 
safe reintegration of the offender according to the rationale of public safety. Where 
these were once considered dichotomous, operating at opposite ends of the spectrum 
of parole governance, agents today explain these goals as being interchangeable. One 
particular parole agent described the duality of Canadian parole as follows: “The 
number one goal is the protection of public safety and the number two goal is the 
integration of offenders” (Interview:Oct 13th 2010). When asked if these goals were 
compatible they replied “absolutely yes because one goal mitigates the other if we are 
properly integrating offenders then we are protecting public safety and if we are 
ensuring public safety we should be properly integrating offenders” (Interview:Oct 13th 
2010). Canadian parole agents prided themselves on maintaining public safety: “I 
believe protecting the community has genuine value...thatʼs a big part of my role and 
one that I value and feel is important” (Interview:Dec 2nd 2010). “To tow the party line: I 
feel like I am contributing to the safety of my community” (Interview:Oct 13th 2010). My 
analysis of the mission statements and mandates of Canadian parole policy also 
emphasizes the duality of parole governance according to the rationale of public safety.
13 Therefore, the assemblage governing Canadian parole today is a hybrid assemblage 
merging risk and need logics similar to Hannah-Moffatʼs hybridization of risk and need; 
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however, the rationale behind this hybridization (public safety) is unlike anything 
discussed thus far.
# Where scholars (see Feeley and Simon:1992, Garland:2001, Hannah-Moffat 
2004 and 2005, Lynch:1998, OʼMalley:2008, and Rose:1996) have been primarily 
concerned with the shift from ʻsocial welfareʼ to ʻcommunity riskʼ this analysis has 
demonstrated that Canadian parole has once again undergone change merging ʻsocial 
welfareʼ and ʻcommunity riskʼ into ʻcommunity safetyʼ or public safety. Similar to the 
findings of Lynch (1998) the public safety rationale is a malleable rationale allowing 
agents in the field of Canadian parole to emphasize and de-emphasize certain 
strategies and techniques as they see appropriate in a particular situation. However, 
unlike the findings of Lynch (1998) and Bayens et al. (1998) Canadian parole agents are 
embracing (to varying degrees) the discourses of parole governance found in policy and 
at the managerial levels and expressed a sense of pride in carrying out orders from 
above. The community safety or public safety approach offers a distinct institutional 
means towards its ends, which entails a move away from a predominately central statist 
approach to problems of crime to one that relies instead upon the forging of 
partnerships on a number of different fronts (Gilling: 2001: 384). These partnerships 
present new ways to solve old problems. Further, “community safety is characterized by 
an eclectic set of measures designed for tackling crime and insecurity and this 
eclecticism is viewed as a virtue, ʻhitting the problem from all sidesʼ and dealing with 
symptoms and causes in a holistic approach that stands in stark contrast to the partial 




# Understanding the field of parole as a ʻfield of struggleʼ illuminates the ways in 
which parole agents and organizations operate within parole utilizing competing and 
contradictory tools, mechanisms, and strategies according to the rationale of public 
safety (Bigo:2005). The ʻfield of struggleʼ also demonstrates gaps between the 
partnerships in Canadian parole and the agency of the parole agent in decision-making. 
Bigo (2005:109-113) warns that we should not “wrongly analyze professionals in the 
field as willing allies or accomplices” and that the field is established between these 
ʻprofessionalsʼ with specific ʻrules of the gameʼ.” Accordingly, in the case of Canadian 
parole the CSC, the NPB, and community residential facilities, while working quite 
intimately together, are distinct organizations charged with separate responsibilities and 
authority despite their congruent goals and assemblage of governance. The struggles 
that take place in the ʻfield of struggleʼ are fundamental in order to understand the 
internal mechanisms of the field of parole and the processes of formation and reach that 
characterize it (Bigo:2005: 125).  It is the ʻfield of struggleʼ conception that allows for an 
analysis of this assemblage or networks of heterogeneous and transversal practices 
(Bigo:2005:133). Larner and Butler (2004) describe the struggle and contestation 
involved in collaborative partnerships through the efforts of a range of actors. The parole 
agent at various levels of parole governance exercises their agency in their navigation 
of the public safety assemblage and in so doing maintain a connection between the 
various organizations and levels of Canadian parole.
# Where the NPB, CSC, and community residential facilities are similar in their 
goals, objectives, and assemblage of parole governance they differ in the means used 
to achieve these goals and objectives. Unlike the NPB, where emphasis is placed on 
autonomy in decision-making, the CSC is a highly structured and bureaucratic agency 
utilizing reports, scales, check-lists, and guidelines to govern the behaviour and 
decision-making practices of its employees. The exclusive jurisdiction over decision-
making granted to the NPB and the highly monitored and confined assessment tools 
utilized by the CSC has resulted in a disconnect or gap between these two agencies. 
This gap could have important implications in the realm of both parole policy and 
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practice particularly in decision making and case rulings. The individual granted the 
autonomy to make parole decisions is not the same individual who collects the 
information upon which this decision is based. Nor are the information collection 
methods and the decision making guidelines held accountable to the same policy 
documents (NPB- policy manual for Board members and CSC- Commissionerʼs 
Directives for parole officers). So while these policies are consistent in their adoption of 
the public safety assemblage there remains an important and consequential gap in 
regards to the structure and authority granted to each agency. 
# Parole agents throughout the various levels of Canadian parole were quick to 
point out this gap and the effects it has on their work practices and partnerships with 
fellow parole organizations. One interviewee explains that parole officers are 
responsible for supervising offenders within the community and they are collectors of 
information (Dec 1st 2010). The Board members will review this information provided by 
the parole officer but they are not expected to concur with these recommendations. The 
parole officer is a conduit or contact point - they submit information to be analyzed by 
Board members for the purposes of decision making. This explanation illustrates that 
agents within Canadian parole work closely together but are involved in a complicated 
relationship that sometimes involves misunderstandings. As one interviewee explains, 
“there are lots of misunderstandings between CSC and the Parole Board of Canada” 
and so workshops are offered in which it is explained “why we do what we do, how we 
do it, and what their role is in all of that” (Interview:Dec 2nd 2010). It was explained that 
there is a “strong relationship” between the CSC and NPB and the NPB hold the CSC 
“to task” because they “count on them” to report accurately and responsibly and there is 
a “trust” between these two agencies (Interview:Dec 2nd 2010). “Itʼs the kind of 
relationship where [CSC] is mostly the givers and [NPB] is mostly the taker...and [CSC] 
can become frustrated with what they feel is [NPBʼs] bureaucratic compulsion for certain 
things but when it is explained that these requirements are found in law and are tested 
in court [CSC] gets on board pretty quickly” (Interview:Dec 2nd 2010). The struggles in 
the field of parole also occur at the lower levels within community residential facilities. 
The community or parole component of CSC is such a small part of the larger 
organization - an organization that from the perspective of a community residential 
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facility thinks in “paramilitary terms” (Interview: Jan 5th 2011). “CSC thinks in very 
institutional terms its very difficult for [certain authorities] to get their heads around a 
community residential facility they would picture a jail in the community” (Interview:Jan 
5th 2011). 
# It was through my discussions with Canadian parole agents that my observed 
difference between Canadian parole policy documents truly became compounded and it 
became clear that the Canadian parole agent (particularly the parole officer as contact 
point) has a challenging job as policy interpreter. Canadian parole agents must navigate 
the field of parole, ʻa field of struggleʼ, in order to implement the goals of the public 
safety assemblage. Further, agents must work together in order to fulfill legislative 
demands and as a result of shared values and objectives; however, interviewees have 
demonstrated the ways in which these partnerships or relationships are complicated by 
the major differences in structure and authority amongst the various organizations and 
the ʻvolatile and contradictoryʼ nature of Canadian parole.
The Problem of ʻPublicʼ Safety
# This study has also uncovered an issue in regards to the public safety 
assemblage of governance and the rationale of public protection. It is this assemblage 
or rationale of parole governance that agents and organizations reference when 
explaining the various mechanisms, tools, strategies, and techniques of parole in 
Canada. The overall goal of public safety allows Canadian parole organizations to shift 
and change their strategies and techniques borrowing from traditional models or more 
recent models of governance. The rationale of public safety draws heavily on the notion 
of social cohesion as evidenced by a community or public. However, nowhere in this 
analysis did either Canadian parole policy documents or agents working within 
Canadian parole make mention of the inclusion of the Canadian public. Both the policy 
documents and agents on several occasions attested to the fact that Canadian parole 
organizations are independent organizations and act independently of the public. 
Despite the fact that parole hearings are open to the public and the media, despite the 
fact that parole officers rely heavily on information collected from community contacts, 
and despite the fact that parole agencies are ʻopen and transparentʼ the public are not 
consulted in regards to parole decisions, community strategies or most importantly what 
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constitutes public safety. In fact, no where in these policy documents is public safety 
even defined and if it is being defined among parole agents it is done behind closed 
doors. As a result, there is an imposed sense of public safety where ʻweʼ the public are 
informed what in fact will make ʻusʼ safe. This presupposes a form of a well-ordered or 
normative society in which it can be assumed that a singular public agrees on a singular 
conception of safety which can be determined by a governing body. 
# This sort of governing stems back centuries to what governance scholars call 
pastoral, ambivalent, or parental governance. Foucault (1978 and 1997) explains 
pastoral governance as a game in which a select few were taught to govern others and 
these others allowed themselves to be governed because it appeared this governing 
was being done in such a way as to ʻguardʼ or ʻlook out for the othersʼ. Agamben 
(1998:77) describes this process as ambivalence in which the governing body appears 
as ambivalent and therefore has no difficulty extending itself over every field of the 
social. More recently paternal or parental governance is described as acting on behalf 
of the good of another person without that personʼs consent - as a parent would do for 
children (Suber:1999:632). It is this governing on behalf of others without their consent 
according to pastoral power, ambivalence, or parental governance that appears to be 
the case in Canadian parole. While the public safety assemblage of parole governance 
is useful in that it allows for a hybrid conception of Canadian parole governance, 
embracing a fluid understanding of risk and need and utilizes a multitude of techniques 
and strategies, the rationale of public protection has afforded the government (in the 
case of Canadian parole) the authority to act on behalf of the ʻpublicʼ without first 
consulting this ʻpublicʼ. The public safety assemblage has allowed for an instantiation of 
parental governance whereby organizations and agents responsible for Canadian 
parole act on behalf of the public determining what constitutes public safety and how 




! While this study has shed light on the practices and policies of Canadian parole 
this field is significantly under-researched and scholars should continue to research 
parole in Canada. Future research projects should concentrate on the gaps between the 
various organizations and structures in Canadian parole and the consequences that 
result from these gaps. Also, researchers should further explore the role of the public in 
Canadian parole policies and practices asking specifically: Should the public be 
consulted in regards to parole decisions and what constitutes public safety? While 
scholars such as Lynch (1998) and Hannah-Moffat (2004 and 2005) have begun to 
investigate the role of the field agent further research is needed in order to understand 
the field agentʼs perception of their role in parole governance. This study did 
successfully compile a variety of perspectives in regards to the narratives of parole 
agents; however, I was unable to interview parole board members due to a lack of 
resources and time which are needed to pursue this exclusive group. The suggestion is 
that future researchers, with more time and resources, should pursue the difficult to 
reach groups within Canadian parole organizations (such as Parole Board members). 
These difficult to access groups will provide further insight into Canadian parole policy 
and practice and would be worthwhile pursuing. Lastly, research should be done in 
regards to the offenders experience and their interpretation of Canadian parole in order 
to determine the ways in which this is similar and unique from the parole agentʼs 
experience.
!  Canadian parole today is characterized by a new hybrid penology endorsing 
public safety as a paramount goal encompassing both neo-liberal risk-management 
strategies and traditional welfare-based strategies. This public safety assemblage 
permeates both parole legislation and policy documents and is embraced by agents in 
the field who implement (to varying degrees) the policy objectives from above. It was 
explained that parole in Canada coalesces what has previously been understood as 
dichotomous rationales of governances in which risk is fluid encompassing the needs of 
offenderʼs in order to ensure the offenderʼs smooth transition into the community and to 
mitigate undue risk to society. It was argued that due to the structure and authority 
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granted to the various organizations within Canadian parole there exists a gap or 
disconnect which has consequences in regards to decision making and makes the field 
agents job as policy interpreter particularly difficult. Also, the public safety assemblage 
is problematic as it utilizes the notion of public safety in justifying the various means of 
parole without consulting the public in regards to what constitutes public safety. 
# It is clear that past examinations of penal governance have often resulted in over 
simplified explanations of a very complex field that cannot adequately be explained by a 
singular body of practices and/or mechanism of governance. The dual methods and 
governmentality analytic utilized in this study allowed for a more holistic exploration of 
Canadian parole and was better able to explain what constitutes Canadian parole policy  
and practice accounting for multiplicities, contradictions, and the public safety rationale 
that allows these contradictions to coexist. Parole in Canada does not suffer from a lack 
of a rationale or a suitable set of terms that defines the institutions identity as Garland 
(1990:6) would have us believe. Therefore, parole in Canada is not in ʻcrisisʼ; rather, 
Canadian parole is engaged in a struggle in which organizations responsible for parole 
governance and agents working in the field navigate the public safety assemblage of 
Canadian parole utilizing incoherent and inconsistent policies and practices.
End Notes
1. This study, primarily concerned with the governance of Canadian parole, utilized the 
following research questions: Are Canadian parole agencies experiencing changes in 
policy orientations? Does Canadian parole policy and/or practice demonstrate an 
orientation towards a neo-liberal, welfare, or hybrid parole assemblage? In what ways 
do policies affect the work practices of parole agents? These questions (among others) 
were first explored in a critical discourse analysis of the policies laid out by corrections 
Canada in the Commissioners Directives, the National Parole Board in their policy 
manual and in parole legislation such as the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. 
The above mentioned research questions (along with others) were also explored 
through semi-structured interviews with agents working in the field of Canadian parole. 
These interviews focused on the practices and decision-making processes deployed by 
agents in their everyday work and pay particular attention to whether or not field agents 
are embracing the policy discourses of upper management. Through these interviews 
the voices of parole agents are useful in developing the particulars of parole practice on 
the one hand and exposing the resources and constraints on agent decision-making on 
the other. Through a process of comparing, contrasting, and amalgamating these two 
methods I was able to illuminate various representations of the field of parole as well as 
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uncover the assemblage of parole governance informing both policy formation and the 
work practices of agents in the field.
2. Recently, scholars (see Hunt and Wickham: 1994:75-78, OʼMalley:2008:454, and 
Rose et al:2006:85-90) have expanded Foucaultʼs concept of governmentality to include 
generalized and disperse practices rather than being only what states do.
#
3. Dean (in OʼConnor and Ilcan:2005:3) describes this transformative movement as a 
process of folding, a process that takes place in the domain of government.
4. The welfare assemblage is often discussed in relation to the welfare state; whereby, 
the state enforces solidarity and prevents dissolution by providing for the needs of the 
national population, ensuring the rights and liberties of socially responsible citizens and 
neutralizing the threat of social dangers (Dean:2010:181). While the welfare 
assemblage finds its heritage in the welfare state, the welfare assemblage of parole 
governance is particularly concerned with offender needs and is concerned with the 
treatment and transformation of offenders in order to restore peace and prevent 
recidivism.
5. According to Feeley and Simon (1992:450) new penology involves the emergence of 
new discourses where probability and risk increasingly displace discourses of clinical 
diagnosis (of needs) and restorative justice (or reintegration). Further, new system 
objectives give primacy to the control of system processes in place of objectives of 
rehabilitation and new techniques that target offenders as an aggregate rather than as 
individuals (Feeley and Simon:1992, Lynch:1998, Foucault:1978, and Hannah-Moffat:
2005). Feeley and Simon (1992:455) explain, “new penology is neither about punishing 
nor rehabilitating individuals it is about identifying and managing unruly groups.”
6. Lynch (1998) found evidence of discourses of new penological strategies favouring 
risk management techniques associated with the neo-liberal assemblage. However, 
Lynchʼs results demonstrate that discourses favouring welfare and law-enforcement 
strategies also shape parole agentʼs identity formation.
7. According to Bayens et al. (1998:53) ISP is expected to provide increased levels of 
offender surveillance and within most ISP programs risk and needs assessment further 
separates offenders into levels of supervision (high, close, intermediate, and reduced 
supervision). The results of the study by Bayens et al. suggests that ISP officers spent 
most of their supervision time with offenders assigned to the intermediate classification 
not with offenders assigned to the high or close classifications.
8. A detailed description of the intervieweeʼs gender, ethnicity, race, education, amount 
of time working with the agencyʼs, and other background information has been excluded 
from this study in order to maintain the anonymity and confidentiality of participants. 
Further, specific locations and names of individual organizations or institutional 
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branches have been omitted in order to maintain the anonymity and confidentiality of 
participantsʼ place of work.
9. A CRF would be in a contractual agreement with either the CSC or NPB and 
expectations are set out by the contracting organization according to their respective 
legislative demands.
10. Level A being the most frequent level of intervention for offenders ranked as ʻhighʼ 
risk, level B ʻmediumʼ risk, level C ʻlowʼ risk, level D offenders with no conditions at level 
C for a minimum of one year, and level E for offenders with no conditions at level C for a 
minimum of one year (CSC:2008:5). The initial thirty day period of an offenderʼs release 
is an assessment period for the parole officer to accurately assess the offenderʼs 
required level of intervention (CSC:2008:6).
11. Static factor assessment includes offences (previous and current), severity of 
offence, type of victim, degree of force used, degree of physical and psychological harm 
to victim, and a sex offence history checklist (CSC:2008:1-10). However, dynamic factor 
analysis is used to obtain the level of need for each target domain being assessed 
(CSC:2007:1). These domains include: employment, marital/family, associates/social 
interaction, substance abuse, community functioning, personal/emotional orientation, 
attitude and an overall dynamic factor rating (CSC:2007: -2). 
12. In November 2009, the CSC began making amendments to some of the existing 
elements of the Commissionerʼs Directives through a series of documents: 
ʻTransforming Correctionsʼ. Preliminary changes include; enhancing offender 
accountability, enhancing correctional programs and interventions, and strengthening 
community corrections (Transforming Corrections:2009:2). The CSC goes on to list 
some of the objectives which have been implemented including; a controversial 
electronic monitoring pilot project, a pilot project for enhancing staff safety, and 
community consultations regarding the location of parole offices and community 
residential facilities. The CSC also notes ongoing objectives which include; the 
development of an integrated approach for offender reintegration planning, the 
evaluation of ongoing pilot projects, and the clarification and the development of the role 
of community based residential facilities (Transforming Corrections:2009:8).
13. Recall: “The purpose of the federal correctional system is to contribute to the 
maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society” (CCRA:1992: 4). “The protection of 
society is the paramount consideration in any conditional release decision” (NPB:
2010:1.2). Also, the Commissionerʼs Directives were written in the interest of safe 
reintegration and public safety (CSC:2008:1).
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